The UN Security Council is one of few international institutions that can make binding decisions, and indeed, authorise war (or “use all necessary measures” in the parlance of Security Council Resolutions). It is therefore not surprising that its reform is being discussed particularly actively by member states.

However, reform will be difficult to carry out. The most serious drawback is the discrepancy between the UN’s principle of sovereign equality of states and the privileged positions of five permanent members, especially in relation to the veto power. It is at least strange that an important and influential player as Germany is excluded from the Council’s decision-making process, in not being a permanent member. The same is true of other states that play a significant role in regional and international affairs but only a very moderate one within the Security Council, such as Brasil or Turkey.

It is not surprising, then, that more and more decisions on regional conflicts, for example, just do not have any positive impact as regional players are omitted from the decision-making process at the expense of the Permanent 5. Furthermore, important decisions are often just impossible to make due to blockage by one or more permanent members.  

The second weakness lies in settling international disputes. Here the Security Council very much relies on the military power of the US, which sometimes lets the US force the Council into taking decisions that are more beneficial for its national interest than for the welfare of other members. As Madeleine Albright ironically commented regarding the US, within the UN “Americans tend to dislike the word ‘multilateralism’. It has too many syllables and ends in an ‘ism’”.

But as we can more and more see, in a globalised world it is impossible to deal with every issue alone, even for the United States.

The main problem inherent to the Security Council is therefore the lack of democracy in its organisation and in the decision-making process. What is usually suggested in order to overcome this problem is, first, expansion of the Council’s membership and, second, the reform of the veto power. These measures should help to create a more fair and democratic structure and provide states with more or less equal opportunity to participate in decision-making process. Britain is among those members who understand the necessity of this change and advocate the need for expansion of the permanent membership to include Germany, India, Brazil and Japan, as well as a permanent African representative.

In this respect there are several interesting aspects of this. First, Britain should increase its cooperation with France and the US. This particular trio would be able to push ideas forward among the allies. A lack of cooperation and joint actions seems to be the main reason for any reforms taking so long. Second, it is necessary that dialogue be entered into with Russia. The sanctions imposed on the country have proven to be unsuccessful – its position on Ukraine has not changed significantly. Every new attempt to alienate it will only cause further escalation. Among other Western permanent members, Britain, which has the strongest economic and financial ties with Russia, has a good chance of initiating such a dialogue. Russia holds similar views on UNSC expansion and could help to expand discussions with China, which traditionally holds a very cautious position.

This enhanced multi-vector approach to cooperation should not only boost the initiative for taking real action. This involvement and interconnection of all P5 members should create a certain balance of power within the Council in order to overcome its heavy reliance on the US.

At the same time, what Britain should decisively oppose is any rhetoric about possible permanent EU representation in the Council. This would make the already rigid and slow process of decision-making even more problematic. Although the aim of the UN is to provide a quick and effective response to crises, it first has to coordinate points of view and stances among its members before expressing any coherent position, which further complicates matters.

It would be naïve to think that the veto power of permanent members can be changed. It would be impossible to imagine a situation in which any of the P5 would deliberately agree to the sacrifice of such a crucial instrument within international decision-making. Instead, it would be more realistic to grant new permanent members with limited veto power. For example, each new permanent member could use this power four times per year, or use it with a coalition of a minimum of three new permanent members. This would balance the power of the P5 and allow other members to play a more important role in the decision-making process.

The time for reform is already ripe enough. With the constantly increasing threat to international security, the international community cannot afford the luxury of continuing reform discussions without bringing any change. Britain, with its special relationship with the US, EU membership, and strong (though uneasy) economic ties with Russia, might potentially be the country who finally boosts the reform.