The latest reports bring news of significant successes in the fight against terrorists in the Middle East and Africa. On 13 March, Iraqi soldiers fighting the Islamic State were able to take large swathes of Tikrit; they continue the liberation of Northern Iraq. Recently, Nigerian troops have led other forces in successful battles against Boko Haram.
On the one hand, this is obviously a good sign, as terrorists are engaged and defeated in battle all over the world. On the other, simply eliminating terrorists physically is not enough.
Russia is a good example of this phenomenon. Every two or three months, a new counter-terrorist operation is announced in the North Caucasus; it usually ends up killing several gunmen. But the overall situation does not change as new terrorists emerge and continue their fight. The situation in Russia, as with groups like IS, Boko Haram, Al Qaeda, Taliban and others, looks pretty much the same: ‘mowing the lawn’ reaps only few gains, as new fighters and groups spring up.
One of the reasons for their resilience is that they receive generous external financial support. This might come from individuals, who have not been spotted by intelligence and security services, but all too often, states know about personal sponsorship or funding of terror activities – but do not react.
Worse still is when the government itself acts as a state sponsor of terrorism.
One of these countries is Saudi Arabia. It is known as a ‘passive sponsor’ as its government knows its citizens give support to various terrorist organisations but it does nothing to prevent it.
Saudi Arabia has been called the ‘largest cash-machine’ in the world for terrorist organisations. In a secret report in December 2009, the US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, noted that ‘More needs to be done since Saudi Arabia remains a critical financial support base for al-Qaida, the Taliban, LeT and other terrorist groups‘.
This is very problematic. Saudi Arabia is perhaps, other than Israel, the most important ally for both the US and Britain in the Middle East. It is one of the largest oil producers in the world, one of the most stable regimes in the region, one of the richest Arab countries, and also an important investor to the UK’s economy.
At the same time, recent UK-Saudi relations have not been ideal. The massive human rights violations in this Gulf country have emerged again and again in UK public and parliamentary debates.
Yet motivations seem to be pretty strong in Saudi Arabia for allowing the continued sponsorship of terrorist organisations.
Support for Islamists in Saudi Arabia gives the government a better reputation and greater authority within the country among those Saudis who would prefer their leaders be less strongly linked with the US, and a greater status within the region and among surrounding neighbours.
In this sense sponsoring terrorism could be considered a specific variant of soft power – ‘aggressive’ soft power. By using it, countries like Saudi Arabia primarily show their adherence to the principles of Islam and sympathy to those fighting for the purity of their state and religion – regardless of their ties with the US. Moreover, in this way they demonstrate their strength, proving that those who sponsor terrorists can also influence and control them, which is extremely important in this region.
Sponsoring terrorism can help to destabilise Saudi Arabia’s most dangerous and irreconcilable rivals. For example, their old enemy, Syria, was known to be another important player in the region and a serious pretender to regional hegemony. When the recent turmoil exploded, Saudi Arabia and others started sponsoring Syrian rebels. Even if Assad’s regime manages to survive it will be severely weakened.
Saudi national aspirations are linked to foreign policy and, therefore, difficult to overcome. Saudi Arabia is by no means an easy partner in counter-terrorism activities. Nevertheless, recent developments like the emergence of IS might give some hope for change. IS (also believed to be initially financed by Saudi Arabia) have now turned against their sponsors and started committing attacks on Saudi borders.
Moreover, while Saudi Arabia has enough power to defeat IS attacks, it might be not as successful in fighting IS ideologically. Their religious views have a great deal in common, and thus IS potentially can find large support within the country. The Saudi government seems to be now in the situation of a serious regime threat from destabilising foreign elements.
This is the moment which Britain and the US could effectively exploit. At a time when the threat of IS is still high, the regime feels much more vulnerable than usual. In addition, the seat of power has just changed and a new king is taking only his first steps on his way as a leader. This is a good moment to impose more diplomatic pressure on Saudi Arabia to force it to take measures to identify and eliminate sources of terrorist sponsorship within the country.
Now is the time too for Saudi Arabia’s desire to maintain the House of Saud’s hegemony to overbalance the perceived foreign policy benefits of sponsoring terrorism. American, British and Saudi Arabian interests are coinciding; the West must be very sure not to miss this opportunity.

